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COLORADO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
(EDrroa's Nom-It is intended to print brief abstracts of the decisions of the
Supreme Court in the issue of Dicta next appearing after the rendition thereof. In the
event of the filing of a petition for rehearing, resulting in any change or modification
of opinion, such will be indicated in later digests.)

APPEAL AND ERROR-TIME FOR FILING BRIEF-NO. 12514Connell vs. Continental Casualty Company, et al-Decided

March 24, 1930.
Facts.-Connell filed a petition in the District Court to
set aside default judgment in a workman's compensation case.
Petition was denied and writ of error was issued November
30, 1929. Plaintiff in error filed his printed abstract January
20, 1930 and his printed brief February 19, 1930. February
21, 1930 two of the defendants in error filed motions to dismiss the writ for failure of the plaintiff in error to file his
brief within 15 days after the issuance of the writ, the time
limited by rule 45 in Industrial Commission cases.
Held.-Assuming that this case is governed by rule 45,
the motion to dismiss is denied because the defendants in error
delayed until February 21, 1930 to file their motions, after
plaintiff in error had incurred the expense of having his abstract and brief printed.
Motion Denied.
BANKS AND

BANKING-COLLECTION

OF CHECKS--NEGLI-

GENCE-NO. 12143-FederalReserve Bank of Kansas City

vs. First National Bank of Denver-Decided March 3,
1930.
Facts.-The Amicon Company which had an $8,000.00
checking account in the Ordway State Bank, drew its checks
in this amount and sent them to the Hallack & Howard Lumber Company, which on September 27, 1921 endorsed these
checks and deposited them with the plaintiff for collection,
using deposit slip which provided that plaintiff would not be
liable for negligence or loss incurred in connection with mail
items, and that out-of-town collections not pgid would be
charged back to the account of the depositor.

DICTA

Plaintiff credited the checks to the Lumber Company's
account, sent them for collection to defendant, which thereupon endorsed them and sent them for payment to the Ordway
State Bank on which they were drawn. The Ordway State
Bank received them on September 29, and on October 5, 1921
issued in payment thereof its draft to the Central Savings
Bank & Trust Company, stamped the checks paid and charged
them to the Amicon Company's account. The draft on the
Trust Company was received by defendant through the mail
October 6, presented to the Trust Company and dishonored.
October 8 the Ordway State Bank was closed. Three weeks
later defendant notified plaintiff of this failure of the collection.
Plaintiff alleges that defendant was negligent in (1) forwarding the checks direct to the bank on which they were
drawn, (2) accepting payment in its draft instead of cash, and
(3) delaying nine days in taking any action after the draft
was dishonored.
Held.-In view of all the facts including the circumstances under which the Lumber Company deposited the
checks with plaintiff, the defendant was negligent in all three
of the respects complained of, and decisions from other jurisdictions in which the facts are materially different cannot
govern.
Judgment Affirmed.
CONTRACT

TO

SELL

STOCK -

LIMITATIONS-

REASONABLE

TIME-NO. 12193-Johnson vs. Johnson-DecidedMarch
10, 1930.
Facts.-Plaintiff, Arthur C. Johnson, and his brother,
Fred, owned all of the stock of a corporation, Arthur owning
1,501 shares and Fred owning 1,499 shares. In 1919 they
made an agreement that in consideration of Arthur's selling
100 shares to a third party, Fred would sell Arthur 100 shares
at $15.00 a share "at any time considered proper". The object
of the contract was to put the control in Fred during the lifetime of both brothers, but to permit a passing of control to
Arthur at Fred's death. Fred died in 1922. His will, giving
all of his stock to his widow, Marie F. Johnson, was probated
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the same year. The estate was closed in 1926. During the
pendency of the estate proceedings there were various negotiations between Arthur and Foley, the executor, but no definite results were accomplished until 1927 when Foley wrote
Arthur a letter stating that the 100 shares in question would
not be sold to Arthur. The principal questions are: 1.
Whether this suit for specific performance will lie; 2. Whether Arthur is estopped on account of certain dealings with defendant; 3. Whether Arthur's claim is barred by the statute
of non-claim, Section 5331, Compiled Laws of 1921; 4.
Whether this suit is barred because of an implied trust; 5.
Whether Arthur exercised the option during its life.
Held.-l. This is the correct form of suit. 2. The estoppel was not correctly pleaded. 3. Arthur's demand was not
barred by the statute of non-claim. 4. This is not an implied
trust. 5. There is no finding by the trial court as to whether
the option in the contract was exercised during its life, that
is, within a reasonable time, and the cause is therefore remanded for a finding of fact on this point.
Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded.
COUNTY COMMISSIONER-CLAIM FOR SERVICES--No. 12275-

Samples vs. Board of County Commissioners, Elbert County, Colorado-Decided March 17, 1930.
Facts.-Samples, a water commissioner, for himself, and
as assignee of one Hall, his deputy, filed claims with the Board
of County Commissioners. Samples' claims named the county, bore the respective dates, set forth his capacity as water
commissioner, gave the days when he served and the rate per
day. Hall's claims, however, did not mention the month or
year in which his services were rendered, did not state that
he was a deputy water commissioner, and did not state that
he rendered' services. The trial court disallowed both claims.
The only question is whether any or all of these claims are
in the form required by statute.
Held.-Samples' claims are in substantial accord with
the statute and should be allowed, but Hall's claims were not
made according to law and are, therefore, disallowed.
Judgment Affirmed in Partand Reversed in Part.

DICTA
CRIMINAL LAW-EVIDENCE-DIRECTED VERDICT-INSTRUC-

TIONS-No. 12560-A4dams vs. People-Decided March

10,1930.
Facts.-Adams was found guilty of a second violation of
intoxicating liquor laws. At the trial the evidence showed
that one Culbertson, a prohibition agent, and another had
bought intoxicating liquor from Adams. His counsel asked
the prosecution witness, Culbertson, if he had not been divorced, how long he had been a stool pigeon, etc. This evidence was excluded. Adams, in due course, moved for a
directed verdict. The motion was overruled and defendant
noted an exception, but the motion and the grounds therefor
do not appear in the record. Adams requested an instruction
that uncorroborated evidence of witnesses participating in the
commission of a crime is to be regarded with suspicion.
Held.-Defense counsel's questioning of Culbertson was
inexcusable and the evidence was properly excluded. The
motion for a directed verdict and the exception to the court's
ruling thereon failing to appear in the record, the ruling cannot be considered on review. The instruction requested by
defendant was improper because the purchase of the liquor
by the prosecution witnesses was not a crime.
Judgment Affirmed.
CRIMINAL LAW-PLEA OF GUILTY-RIGHT TO APPEAL-No.

12497-People vs. Brown, et al.-DecidedMarch 31, 1930.
Facts.-Brown was charged with the unlawful possession
of intoxicating liquor before a justice of the peace. He pleaded guilty and the minimum fine was assessed.. He appealed
to the county court, and the district attorney moved for dismissal on the ground that there was no appeal from such a
judgment of the justice of the peace. The motion was overruled; the district attorney declined to prosecute further and
the defendant was discharged.
Held.-Defendant's only right to appeal was statutory.
The statute does not permit an appeal on this state of facts.
The appeal therefore was a nullity and the judgment of the
justice of the peace still stands.
Judgment Reversed.
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12041-Nelson vs. Van
3, 1930.
March
Schaack & Company-Decided
Facts.-Nelson sued the Company to enjoin foreclosure
of deed of trust and for damages for alleged fraudulent representations. He was non-suited in the trial court.
In 1926 the parties made a contract for the exchange of
real estate in Denver under which Nelson received a terrace
subject to encumbrance and gave additional encumbrance to
the Company. The suit here is for damages on the ground
that Nelson relied on the Company's statements about the terrace and that these statements were false. The evidence
showed that Nelson had been a builder in Denver for 27 years,
that he had examined the terrace, had discussed the matter
with friends and had consulted a realtor about the exchange.
Held.-The facts showed that Nelson did not rely on the
Company's statements. He is, therefore, not entitled to damages.
Judgment Affirmed.
DECEIT-ELEMENTS--PROOF-NO.

DEED OF TRUST-FORECLOSURE PRIORITY-No. 12309-Bray

vs. Trower-Decided March 24, 1930.
Facts.-In April, 1919, Trower owned land in Kiowa
County. He agreed to sell the land to Doll, et al, or their
nominee and thereafter executed a warranty deed with the
name of the purchaser left blank, and deposited it with Doll.
The name of one Parks was filled in and he executed a note and
deed of trust for $1,600.00 in favor of Doll. By mesne conveyances Bray became the owner of this note and deed of
trust. At the same time the $1,600.00 note was executed Parks
executed another note and deed of trust for $4,800.00 in favor
of Trower. This encumbrance was recorded after the $1,600.00
deed of trust. Encumbrance held by Bray being in default
he brought suit to foreclose, but was stopped by a permanent
injunction issued by the trial court. Trower alleges that his
encumbrance is superior to Bray's because-1. Bray bought
his note after maturity and it is subject to defenses. 2. He,
Trower, was defrauded by Doll. 3. Trower foreclosed his
deed of trust and the public trustee's deed purports to give him
clear title. 4. He did not know of Bray's trust deed till 1926.
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5. His trust deed is a purchase money mortgage and entitled
to precedence. 6. Case is moot because Bray stopped his
foreclosure in accordance with the injunction of the District
Court.
Held.-I. The time of Bray's purchase of the note is immaterial because this is not a suit against the original maker
of the note. 2. Doll's alleged fraud cannot avail Trower in
a suit against Bray. 3. The public trustee's certificate of sale
issued to Trower is specifically subject to Bray's encumbrance
and the public trustee's deed did not change the title taken
by Trower. 4. Trower must have known of Bray's encumbrance long before 1926. 5. Bray's deed of trust is a purchase
money mortgage as much as Trower's. 6. The case is not
moot because Bray stopped his foreclosure only in obedience
to an injunction.
Judgment Reversed.
12400-Blackmer vs. Blackmer, et al-DecidedMarch 3, 1930.
Facts.--Plaintiff brought suit for divorce, which was refused by the trial court, whereupon plaintiff appealed.
Held.-In an action for divorce no writ of error lies
where there has been no judgment of divorce.
Writ of Error Dismissed.
DIVORCE-WRIT OF ERROR-No.

12249
-Model Land and Irrigation Company vs. Madsen-Decided March 3, 1930.
Facts.-Plaintiffheld a large amount of land under the
Desert Entry Act and operated an irrigating canal to concentrate the use of certain water on this land. Madsen purchased
certain water stock and attempted to use it on ground distant
from the Model tract.
A bylaw of the company provided that no transfer of
water from one tract to another could be made without theapproval of the Board of Directors. The Board refused to
approve Madsen's contemplated transfer, but he nevertheless
used the water on his land. The company brought this action
IRRIGATION COMPANY-BYLAWS--USE OF WATER-NO.

DICTA

to restrain such use, was defeated in the lower court and appealed.
Held.-The bylaw in question is reasonable and enforceable.
Judgment Reversed.
IRRIGATION DISTRICT-BONDS--STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION-

No. 12152-Coun-ty Commissioners, Adams County, et al.
vs. Heath, et al.-DecidedMarch 10, 1930.
Facts.-The North Denver Municipal Irrigation District issued $673,000 of 6% coupon bonds. Heath held four
$500 bonds and one hundred and one $15.00 interest coupons.
The commissioners, in making the levy in 1924 for the tax of
1925, did not increase the rate by 15 per cent of the bonds
then maturing as alleged to be provided by Section 1997 C. L.
1921, and Heath brought mandamus to compel the increase
in levy. The lower court directed that the additional levy
be made.
Held.-The unpaid amount of one year's taxes cannot be
collected by levying an additional 15 per cent upon those who
pay the following years' taxes for the purpose of discharging
the proportionate obligation of those who have not paid. The
provisions of Section 1997, C. L. 1921, may apply to delinquencies to cover maintenance, operating and other expenses
of the district, but its provisions cannot be extended beyond
the cost of these items.
Judgment Reversed..
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE-JURISDICTION-WRIT OF PROHIBI-

TION-NO. 12537-Walker, Justice of the Peace, et al vs.
People ex rel. T. M. Uchida-DecidedMarch 10, 1930.
Facts.-Uchidawas a resident of Justice Precinct No. 1
in Pueblo. He was served by McAllister with a summons
issued by Walker, Justice of the Peace in Precinct No. 113 in
Pueblo County. Service was made in Precinct No. 1. Uchida
failed to appear and judgment by default was entered against
him. Thereafter McAllister levied on Uchida's property in
Precinct No. 1, and proceeded to advertise it for sale. Uchida
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sued out a Writ of Prohibition in the District Court which
held that the Justice Court judgment was void.
Held.-Although Section 6044 C. L. 1921 provides that
suit should be commenced before justices in the township in
which the defendant resides, the word "township" must be
construed to mean "precinct". The Justice Court, therefore,
had no jurisdiction over Uchida, there was no duty upon him
to appear, judgment is void and the Writ of Prohibition was
properly entered in the District Court.
Judgment Affirmed.
12175-Hubert
L. Corder and The Maryland Casualty Company, a corporation v. The People of the State of Colorado, etc.-Decided March 31, 1930.
Facts.-On the evening of October 31, 1926 plaintiff
Smiley and several other boys from the town of Pierce, Colorado, were indulging in Halloween pranks. Defendant Hatfield, a deputy sheriff, who was a store-keeper in the town,
pursued the boys, warned them to stop their mischief-making;
said that he was deputy sheriff and would make them respect
the law. The boys continued and Hatfield fired several shots,
one of which struck Smiley, who in due course brought this
action against Corder and the Casualty Company, the official
surety on Corder's bond as sheriff. Defendants contended that
there was no competent evidence that Hatfield was acting in
an official capacity and the case was submitted to a jury which
found for Smiley.
Held.-There was sufficient evidence to go to the jury
and the verdict is sustained.
Judgment Affirmed.
LIABILITY OF SHERIFF-ACT OF DEPUTY-No.

POSSESSION OF REALTY-HOMESTEAD--NO.

12039-Vassek vs.

Moffat County Mercantile Corporation-DecidedMarch
3,1930.
Facts.-Mercantile Company brought an action against
defendant below (plaintiff here) to recover possession of
farm lands. The defendant, Ignatz Vassek, had taken the
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necessary steps to secure to him a homestead right in the lands
in question. Thereafter defendant's wife, Rosa Vassek, became ill and they left the State of Colorado for about six
months, during which time their six minor children remained
in the house on the disputed lands.
Mercantile Company alleged that the absent defendants
were not in possession.
Held.-Under these facts the defendants, Ignatz and
Rosa Vassek were in such possession as is contemplated by the
statute giving homestead rights, and they are, therefore, entitled to the benefits of the statute.
Judgment Reversed and Case Remanded.
SALE- DESCRIPTION - No. 12296Denver and Salt Lake Railway vs. Hitchcock and Tinkler
Equipment Co.-Decided March 3, 1930.
Facts.-Defendant here, plaintiff below, brought an action for damages for the conversion of personalty. The property belonged originally to the Moffat Tunnel Commission,
which entered into a lease with defendant covering the Moffat
Tunnel approaches, tracks, etc., "together with all other property rights, easements and appurtenances connected with said
PERSONAL PROPERTY-

Railroad Company, its approaches and equipment . . . that

may be useful, incident or convenient for the use and operation of said Railroad Tunnel." Thereafter the Commission
advertised for sale the property here involved and executed
a bill of sale to plaintiff covering it.
Held.-The evidence for trial showed that the property
in question was not "useful, incident or convenient for the use
and operation of said Railroad Tunnel." It was, therefore,
not covered by the lease and belongs to plaintiff under its bill
of sale.
Judgment Affirmed.
PROMISSORY NOTE-EXTENSION-LIMITATIONS--No.

12545

-American Medical and Dental Ass'n. vs. Grant-Decided March 10, 1930.
Facts.-Grantexecuted a promissory note dated March
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1, 1918, in the amount of $165.00, payable to A. J. Pate, and
containing this clause: "The makers and endorsers hereof
* * *

agree to any extensions of time payment and partial

payments before, at or after maturity." On the reverse side
appeared the following: "Payment of this note is hereby extended to Sept. 1st, 1924." (Signed) A. J. Pate. There also
appeared Pate's endorsement to the plaintiff in error. Grant
denied the making of any extension agreement and affirmatively pleaded the statute of limitations.
Held.-The association having pleaded an extension of
time, the burden was upon it to establish this fact. An extension of a note cannot be made without an actual agreement.
No agreement having been proved here, the note is barred.
Judgment Affirmed.
RELIGIOUS CORPORATION'S SUIT BY MEMBERS--No. 12156-

German EvangelicalEmmaus Church vs. Free Evangelical
Emmaus Church-DecidedMarch 24,1930.
Facts.-Ehlrich,et al, as members of plaintiff congregation brought this suit in the name of the corporation to prevent defendants occupying a certain church property. The
complaint alleges plaintiff is an incorporated congregation
subject to The German Evangelical Snyod of North America
and that according to the rules of said synod the church counsel is responsible for the property; that the 1926 dissension
arose between Kauerz, then pastor of said congregation, and
certain members; that Kauerz and his followers withdrew
from the synod and organized a new church, but continued
in possession of the old church building. The evidence shows
that Ehlrich and his supporters are a small minority of the
congregation and that they did not demand that the church
counsel act in their behalf or that such a demand would be
unavailing.
Held.-Ehlrich and his supporters have no right to bring
a suit in behalf of the religious corporation without proving
that the officers thereof had refused to bring a suit, or that a
demand would be futile.
Judgment Affirmed.
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TAXATION-LIVESTOCK-AGREEMENT

WITH THE

COUNTY

COMMISSIONERS-NO. 12172-Boyer Bros., Inc. vs. Board

of County Commissioners, etc.-Decided March 31, 1930.
Facts.-Boyer Bros., Inc., engaged in sheep raising in
Wyoming, grazed its sheep on the United States forest reserve
in Routt County parts of each year from 1918 to 1923. In
1916 the company made a written agreement with the county
commissioners providing that the company should be assessed
each year on one-third of the number of sheep brought to
Routt County for grazing. In 1921 the legislature passed an
act (C. L. 1921 Section 7249), providing that when personal
property is brought into the state after April 1 of any year
and is removed before April 1 of the following year, the owner
shall file a schedule with the county assessor, and shall be liable
for a pro rata tax based on that portion of the year in which
the taxable chattels are in the county. Boyer Bros. brought
this action to recover taxes paid under their agreement with
the commissioners for the years from 1918 to 1923. The lower
court gave judgment for the defendants for all these years.
Held-Priorto 1921 there was no basis for the taxation
agreement, Boyer Bros. derived no benefit therefrom, and
they are therefore entitled to recover. Beginning with 1921,
however, the statute made it the duty of the assessor to levy
a tax "according to the best information he can obtain". The
judgment in favor of the commissioners for the years 1921 to
1923 was therefore correct..
Affirmed in Partand Reversed in Part.
Board of County Commissioners of Routt County vs. Routt
County Live Stock Co.-No. 12173-Decided March 31,
1930.
Board of County Commissioners of Routt County vs. Kipp
Sheep Co.-No. 12174-Decided March 31, 1930.
These are companion cases to 12172 and the facts and
holdings are substantially the same.

DICTA
TAX SALE CERTIFICATES-RIGHTS OF PURCHASER-No. 12000

-Ireland vs. Collins, et al. and Gunnison Mountain Coal
and Coke Co.-On Rehearing-DecidedMarch 3, 1930.
Facts.-Certain property of the Coal and Coke Company
went to tax sale in 1922 and 1923, and was struck off to
Gunnison County which transferred the certificates to plaintiff. The County Treasurer later issued tax deeds on part of
the certificates, and as to the tracts included therein plaintiff
brought ejectment, which was defeated below.
The principal question involved is the amount to which
plaintiff is entitled on the cancellation of these deeds and certificates,-the amount on the face of the certificates plus specific taxes and penalties or only the amount which plaintiff
actually paid for them with the usual legal interest.
Held.-The deeds are void, and plaintiff took nothing
but a lien to the extent of the payment of the amount paid for
the certificates, with legal interest thereon. Such payments
by plaintiff did not discharge the tax in full but only so much
thereof as was covered by the money actually received by the
County, the balance of the tax remaining a lien on the property.
Judgment Affirmed.
WARRANTY DEED-DEED OF TRUST-CANCELLATION-FRAUD

-No. 12140-Klein et al vs. Munz, as Executor of estate of
Margaret A. Chatterton-DecidedMarch 17, 1930.
Facts.-Chatterton, on November 16, 1925, executed and
delivered to E. R. Kuhlmann a warranty deed with the
grantee's name left blank. Kuhlmann first inserted the name
of one Danielson, then the name of one Petrone, and then
the name of Lola Kuhlmann, his wife; the latter executed a
note and trust deed on the property and these papers were,
in ordinary course, bought by Klein, who sold them to Fields.
Thereafter Chatterton died and her executor brought this action to cancel the warranty deed and the deed of trust. The
district court held both instruments void and ordered them
cancelled.
Held.-If there was fraud in Kuhlmann having filled in
his wife's name in the warranty deed, it was made possible by
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Chatterton. Her executor stands in the same position as
Chatterton, and it is, therefore, correct to apply the rule that,
when one of two innocent persons must suffer from a fraud,
the one who has made the fraud possible should suffer.
Judgment Reversed.
WATER PRIORITIES-CHANGE OF USE-POINT OF DIVERSION-

No. 12171-Baker, et al. vs. City of Pueblo, et al.-Decided
March 31, 1930.
Facts.-The City of Pueblo filed its petition seeking a
decree permitting it to change the points of diversion of certain waters of the Arkansas River. Plaintiffs in error, junior
appropriators from the same stream, appeared and objected
to the petition. The ditches in question are in two groups:
the general decree for the first providing that the appropriators shall have the right to use the water continuously for
irrigating purposes, and the general decree for the second
group providing priorities without giving the right to a continuous flow. The City of Pueblo sought to change the use
of water from agricultural to domestic. The lower court
awarded the city the right to change the point of diversion of
all the water flowing through the first group of ditches, but
only one-fourth of the water flowing through the second
group.
Held.-The rights of junior appropriators must be carefully guarded. The evidence was that the plaintiffs in error
would be damaged by the change of use of diversion of the
water flowing in both groups of ditches; furthermore, the
continuous flow provided in the general decree for the first
group must be construed to mean only a continuous flow for
these waters insofar as they are needed for agricultural purposes, and does not contemplate a continuous flow day and
night for domestic purposes.
Decree Reversed.
WATER

PRIORITIES-INDIVIDUAL

DECREES-LIMITATIONS-

No. 12232-Kibbee vs. Kostelic-Decided March 10, 1930.

Facts.-There was a general decree for priorities in
Water District No. 11, in which neither Pledger (Kibbee's
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grantor) nor Kostelic appeared. Thereafter, in 1910, Pledger
obtained an individual decree with priority as of March 20,
1898. Kostelic did not appear in this action. In 1927 Kostelic
filed his individual petition asserting a priority from the same
stream, as of May 1, 1886. Kibbee appeared and objected to
Kostelic's claim on the grounds: (1) That Kostelic's claims
could not be determined in his individual proceeding because
his claims arose before the entry of the general decree. (2)
That Kostelic's petition contained insufficient descriptions of
ditches, owners, etc. (3) That Kostelic's claim was barred
by limitation; and (4) Because the evidence was insufficient
to warrant a decree in Kostelic's favor.
Held.-Kostelic's right of action, if any, is barred by
Section 1785, C. L. 1921, which provides a four-years period
of limitation from the time of the entry of a final priority
decree, and also by Section 1789, C. L. 1921, dealing with
arguments and reviews. Both of the above statutes apply to
individual as well as to general priority decrees. It was,
therefore, error for the district court to award Kostelic a
priority superior to that of Kibbee.
Judgment Reversed.
WILLS

AND

ESTATES-DISTRIBUTION-APPEALABLE

INTER-

EST-No. 12506-Fenn, et al. vs. Knauss, et al.-Decided
March 3, 1930.
Facts.-About three and one-half months after Warneke's
will had been probated and letters testamentary issued, the
specific legatees filed a petition asking that their legacies be
paid, alleging that all demands had been paid and tendering
repayment bonds. The executors resisted the petition on the
grounds that one year from the issuance from probate had not
run and that they were entitled to the protection afforded by
the lapse of this time.
The County Court ordered the executors to pay the legacies. The executors appealed to the District Court, which reversed the order of the County Court.
Held.-The executors had no appealable interest in the
order of the County Court and their appeal must be dismissed.
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However, the court does not approve of orders like this, ordering payments of legacies in less than one year from the
issuance of letters.
Judgment Reversed.
WORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION-COURSE

OF EMPLOYMENT-

"HORSE-PLAY"-NO. 12512-McKnight vs. Houck, and
Industrial Commission of Colorado-DecidedMarch 17,
1930.
Facts.-McKnight, plaintiff's son, while employed on the
ranch of Dr. Houck was instructed by Houck to go with one
Arnot, a fellow employe, to count some cattle and to take their
pistols to kill any stray dogs or coyotes. On their return to
the bunk-house they undertook to see which of them could
draw his pistol first. In doing this McKnight was killed.
The District Court held that the killing did not arise in the
course of employment.
Held.-The District Court was correct and the so-called
"doctrine of horse-play" does not exist.
Judgment Affirmed.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS--ABSENCE

FROM STATE-RETRO-

ACTIVE EFFECT-NO. 12170-Jones v. O'Connell-Decided

February 17, 1930.
Facts.-O'Connellsued Jones to recover on a promissory
note which became due November 22, 1912, and time of payment was never extended. Suit was instituted May 27, 1927,
fifteen years after its maturity. Last payment was made on
the note about five years after its maturity and about ten years
before suit was brought. Defense was the Statute of Limitations. Judgment against Jones below.
Held.-I. Actions on promissory notes must be commenced within six years next after the cause of action thereon
shall accrue.
2. The Act of 1921, among other things, provided that
if when a cause of action accrues against a person, he is out
of the State, or has absconded or concealed himself, the period
limited for the commencement of the action by any Statute
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of Limitations shall not begin to run until he comes into the
State, or while he is so absconded or concealed, and if, after
the cause of action accrues he departs from the State, or absconds, or conceals himself, the time of his absence or concealment shall not be included as a part of the period in which
the action must be brought.
3. In this case, the defendant was absent from Colorado
from about June, 1920, and thereafter had his permanent domicile in California. The six years had elapsed before the complaint in this action was filed, and unless the defendant's
(Jones') absence from Colorado suspended the running of the
six year statute, the judgment below was wrong, but,
4. There is no express provision in the Statute of 1921
making it operative as to past transactions. Therefore, the
Statute of 1921 does not affect the rights of the plaintiff or
defendant in this case.
Judgment Reversed.
VENUE-INSURANCE-NO.

12440-Progressive Mutual In-

surance Company v. Mihoover-DecidedFeb. 3, 1930.
Facts.-Mihoover commenced this action against the Insurance Company, a domestic corporation, to recover upon
accident insurance policy issued by the Insurance Company
upon the life of the plaintiff's husband in which policy the
plaintiff was named as beneficiary. The plaintiff resides in
Pueblo County where her husband formerly lived. The application for insurance was made in Pueblo County and the
premiums were there paid, and the husband died there. The
defendant resides in the City and County of Denver where
its principal and only place of business is maintained. Notice
of process was had upon it in Denver. Defendant made application for a change of venue below which was denied.
Held.-l. The contract of insurance is silent as to the
place-of performance in event of loss under the terms of the
policy.
2. Where the contract is silent as to the place of payment the debtor is obliged to seek the creditor in the County
of his residence and at his usual place of business or abode
and make payment to him there.
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3. In the absence of a special provision in the policy
of insurance, the county in which the plaintiff resides is a
proper county in which to commence an action to collect
thereon.
Judgment Affirmed.
ANTE-NUPTIAL CONTRACT - No.
12468-Popham vs. Duncan-DecidedFebruary 24, 1930.
Facts.-Plaintiff in error is the administrator, and defendant in error is the widow of Charles M. Duncan. Duncan
and his wife made an ante-nuptial agreement that they might
separate at any time, that he would pay her $100.00 for each
year they would have lived together, and that she would waive
her right as a widow, in the event of his death. In less than
one year from the agreement they separated; he paid her
$110.00 and she executed a receipt in full. After his death
she claimed a widow's allowance, which the County Court
denied, but which the District Court, on appeal, allowed.
Held.-The alleged ante-nuptial contract is against public policy and is void. Mrs. Duncan is, therefore, entitled to
the widow's allowance.
Judgment Affirmed.

WIDOW'S ALLOWANCE -

STENOGRAPHIC POSITION WANTED
Expert stenographer with ten years' experience
position in law office.

desires

Call MARGARET FALLON

960 Pearl St., Apt. B, YOrk 5216

FOR SALE
Pacific States Reports. 135 vols., in 40 books, extra annotated with Ross Digest 3 vols. All bound in buckram and in
fine condition.
Address, A. D. BULLIS, Fort Morgan, Colorado.

